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Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain1
Javier Martínez-Torrón∗
I. INTRODUCTION
It is probably not pretentious to assert that in the second half of
the 1970s Spain experienced one of the most successful democratic
transitions in history. The metamorphosis of Spain’s political system
was achieved very efficiently, quickly, peacefully, and with the
consensus of the vast majority of Spanish citizens and political forces.
This is certainly unusual considering Spain’s political history, during
which democracy had neither deep nor long-lasting roots.
Within Spain’s turbulent twentieth century, the mid-1970s
political reform had been preceded by thirty-six years of General
Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, which began in 1939 after three
years of civil war that put an end to the Second Republic.2 Shortly
∗ Professor of Law, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain. Vice-President of the
Section of Canon Law and Church-State Relations of the Spanish Royal Academy of
Jurisprudence and Legislation. Member of the Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom
within the Spanish Ministry of Justice. Member of the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Council on
Freedom of Religion or Belief.
1. This essay is inspired by the paper presented to the first plenary session of the 12th
International Law and Religion Symposium: Religion and the World’s Legal Traditions,
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, October 2–5, 2005. Parts of its content proceed
from the Research Project BJU2002-03813, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education and
Science, under the direction of Professor Rafael Navarro-Valls, Complutense University. When
giving my oral presentation, I assumed that the people in the audience were not necessarily
familiar with the legal analysis of church-state issues or with the Spanish system of church-state
relations (historical and present). In writing this text, I have assumed that the same is probably
true with regard to the potential readers of this article. This has moved me to include some
clarifications that would normally be unnecessary were I writing for Spanish jurists. In general,
I have preferred to restrict bibliographical and legal quotations to a minimum, indicating, in
due course, the sources in which further references can be found. For an interesting and
complete data base on publications related to the Spanish law on religious issues, see the
Internet pages of the Área de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado of the University of Almería
(Spain), under the responsibility of Professors José María Vázquez García-Peñuela and María
del Mar Martín, http://www.ual.es/~canonico/inicio1.html (last visited July 22, 2006).
2. The Second Republic was proclaimed by the provisional government of Spain on
April 14, 1931. The military coup d’état of July 18, 1936, is usually considered to be what
commenced the Spanish civil war. General Franco’s troops took Madrid on March 28, 1939,
and he officially announced the end of the war a few days later, on April 1.
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after Franco’s death in 1975,3 Spain rapidly transformed into a
democracy, fully complying with all international standards both on
paper and in practice.4 The most important instrument of that
transformation, and the pillar of the subsequent development of
Spain’s political system, was the Constitution approved by
referendum in late 1978.5
In this movement towards democracy, the 1980 Organic Law on
Religious Freedom (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa)6 played an
essential role. It was the first enacted “organic law” to implement the
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution. It is important
for Spaniards to remember this fact and to analyze its causes so as to
not lose sight of the achievements of Spain’s recent political
evolution and the path Spain followed to reach them. Doing so
would risk the possibility that the contemporary political atmosphere
would ignore, and therefore undermine, a remarkable part of the
basis upon which Spain’s still-young democracy was built.
Such an analysis may be interesting beyond Spain’s borders as
well, especially because Spain’s political situation in the 1970s is not
at all unique. Although each nation has its peculiar history and
circumstances, the existing analogies between some countries are
significant and justify looking at what occurred in Spain twenty-five
years ago. I have in mind certain analogies that relate to the political
situation in the strict sense and also those relating to other issues,
such as socio-religious circumstances or prevailing cultural patterns.
Naturally, it is not my intention to propose that Spain’s political
3. Franco died on November 20, 1975, after a long hospital stay.
4. Naturally, this does not mean that Spain’s democracy does not need to keep
evolving, gaining consistency, and rooting in society. It is one thing to view democracy from
the perspective of the structure and functioning of the political system, which in Spain was
achieved in a few years, and a different thing to establish deep roots of democratic mentality
and civic virtues in the people. The latter takes much more time and not only requires a change
in the legal and political machinery that constitutes the framework of social life, but also a long
and active process of educating society.
5. The Spanish Constitution was promulgated on December 27, 1978, after having
been approved in referendum on December 6, 1978, by the immense majority of voters (87.78
percent, which constituted 58.97 percent of the electoral census). A succinct and precise
description of the elaboration process followed by the Constitution can be found in the
Internet pages of the Congreso de los Diputados (Spanish Congress),
http://www.congreso.es/funciones/constitucion/proceso.htm (last visited July 22, 2006).
6. Ley Orgánica 7/1980, July 5, 1980, de Libertad Religiosa [hereinafter LOLR]. The
so-called “organic laws” require an absolute majority in Congress to be approved, modified, or
abrogated. The laws governing fundamental rights and public freedoms must be organic. Cf.
Constitución art. 81 (Spain) [hereinafter C.E.].
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transition or its system of church-state relations are models for all
nations to imitate. Transplants are of dubious efficiency in
comparative law as well as in politics. However, it is always useful to
learn from other countries’ experiences, from their mistakes, and
from their accomplishments. And perhaps in this sense, Spain’s
example can be of use to other emerging democracies struggling
with issues of religious liberty.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE
ORGANIC LAW ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
An adequate understanding of LOLR and the function it fulfilled
as Spain transitioned to democracy requires that it be read in
connection with the great document that served as the basis for the
entire democratic process: Spain’s 1978 Constitution. It is also
necessary to situate both norms within the context of Spain’s
political and religious history, especially during the 20th century.7
As is well known, the vast majority of Spain’s population, both
traditionally and especially in the last five centuries, is Catholic.8 In

7. Among the general studies on the LOLR and on the constitutional provisions
related to religion, it is worth mentioning two books published a few years after the
Constitution was enacted. They contain a detailed analysis of their respective developmental
process. See JOSÉ J. AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN
ESPAÑOLA DE 1978 (1984); MARÍA J. CIÁURRIZ, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN EL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL: LA LEY ORGÁNICA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA (1984). The former also contains an
interesting historical outline of how the preceding Spanish constitutions dealt with religious
issues.
8. The following paragraphs contain a succinct description of well-known facts.
Therefore, a few general bibliographical references will suffice here (although I will cite some
more specific studies in due course). See Pedro Lombardía, Precedentes del Derecho Eclesiástico
Español, in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 151–74 (1980) for an attractive
summary of church-state relations in Spain in the last centuries. As a larger reference book on
the history of the Catholic Church in Spain, see the seven volumes of HISTORIA DE LA IGLESIA
EN ESPAÑA (Ricardo García Villoslada ed., 1982). For a foreign historian’s perspective, see
STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1984). For
information on particular historical periods, see JOSÉ M. CUENCA TORIBIO, RELACIONES
IGLESIA-ESTADO EN LA ESPAÑA CONTEMPORÁNEA: 1833–1985 (2d ed. 1989), and CHRISTIANS,
MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN SPAIN: INTERACTION AND
CULTURAL CHANGE (Mark D. Meyerson & Edward D. English eds., 1999). For a complete
bibliographical reference on the history of church-state relations in Spain since its configuration
as a modern state, see MARÍA R. ANDRÉS VERDÚ & ISABEL MENDOZA GARCÍA, LAS
RELACIONES IGLESIA-ESTADO: SS. XV–XX (1995), which contains almost six hundred
references. With regard to the history of Spain from a general perspective, the most complete
reference work is the monumental HISTORIA DE ESPAÑA by Menéndez Pidal (for issues related
to Part II of this paper, see volume 17).
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the late fifteenth century, Spain forged its national unity together
with its religious unity. The unity of the new nation was shortly
followed by an ambitious enterprise: the building of an enormous
overseas empire, in which the union between political unity and
religious unity would exercise a decisive influence. To be a Spaniard
and to be a Catholic were understood as equivalent; they were two
sides of a single national identity. As a consequence, adherents of
other religions (such as Judaism and Islam) who refused to convert
were expelled from the kingdom. Following the same political logic,
pseudo-converts and those who abandoned Catholicism to profess a
heresy—particularly the doctrines of Luther or Calvin—were
persecuted and, if they did not repent, publicly condemned at the
hand of the Spanish Inquisition.9 This explains why, until recently,
Protestantism was virtually nonexistent and only a few residual—and
concealed—groups of Jews and Muslims remained in Spain.
We should note that during the same historical period, nationstates were constituted all over Europe following analogous
interpretations of the principle cuius regio eius et religio (the religion
of the prince is the religion of the nation). It is thus natural that the
Catholic Church exercised a tremendous influence in Spain over the
last five hundred years despite the numerous sways of Spain’s internal
politics, which witnessed some intense episodes of anti-clericalism,
and also despite repercussions felt in Spain from events occurring
beyond the peninsula’s borders: from the dismantling of the
American empire to the influx of French-style liberalism and its
subsequent withdrawal after Napoleon Bonaparte’s Spanish
adventure.
From this perspective, the situation was not very different in the
twentieth century, the beginning of which was marked by the
disappearance of overseas Spain and by the social convulsions
provoked by socialist and anarchist movements, which were fueled
by circumstances of severe economic shortage. A significant part of
twentieth century Spanish politics revolved around church-state
relations, which oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, a
9. I am not suggesting that the Spanish kings were determined to guarantee the
kingdom’s religious unity under Catholicism for merely political reasons. The Spanish
monarchy—perhaps more than other monarchies of that period—was committed to defend the
nation’s religion largely for strictly religious reasons, at least throughout the 16th century and
probably also into the 17th century. Proof of this intent is found in the policy the monarchs
followed for the incorporation of the American Continent into the Kingdom of Spain.
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confessional State (i.e., a State officially Catholic that protected, and
somehow also controlled, the Catholic Church at the cost of the
freedom of other religions or ideologies), and, on the other hand, an
anti-religious, and more precisely anti-Catholic, hostility.
We can find a clear and relevant example of the latter approach in
the Spanish Second Republic, Spain’s last democratic experiment
prior to the political transition of the 1970s.10 It is well-known that
the 1931 Republican Constitution, as well as subsequent legislation
on religious issues, adopted a resolutely anti-Catholic attitude.11
Republican legislatures and governments, especially at the beginning
and end of the Republic, were determined to reduce the Catholic
Church’s social influence, which they considered excessive and
incompatible with a democratic and secular state. They failed to
accept the incontrovertible fact that the Church had an enormous
weight in Spain’s social structure. Consequently, they refused to
enact moderate legislation that could reconcile the ecclesiastical
influence with a democratic system and, at the same time, attract the
ecclesiastical hierarchy towards the Republican cause. As some
scholars have pointed out, “there was something anomalous in the
anti-religious policy of the Second Republic,” for the clergy was not
fascist, although it was largely conservative, and peasants were not
anti-clerical, notwithstanding the gradual de-Christianization of the
working class.12
It is probably true that the construction of a strong and
democratic State would have required a readjustment of church-state
relations and a new conception (and decrease) of the predominant
role played by the Catholic Church in Spain’s political, cultural, and
social life. But the Republican government went too far when
adopting measures to reach an objective that, properly understood,
would have been acceptable. Although it is certainly difficult to
judge the protagonists of history from a contemporary perspective, it
is very significant that neither the Republican Constitution’s
10. For a more detailed description with further bibliographical references, see Javier
Martínez-Torrón, Derecho de Asociación y Confesiones Religiosas en la Constitución de 1931, in
ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN: PROCESO DE SECULARIZACIÓN Y LAICIDAD 177–204 (Dionisio
Llamazares ed., 2001).
11. For a complete and interesting study on the making of the Republican
Constitution’s provisions on religious issues, see FERNANDO DE MEER, LA CUESTIÓN
RELIGIOSA EN LAS CORTES CONSTITUYENTES DE LA II REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA (1975).
12. See Rafael Navarro-Valls, La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil Española, in scriptis, which I
read thanks to the author’s courtesy.
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provisions on religious issues nor the legislation later enacted to
implement them would be permitted today in light of international
documents for the protection of human rights. The paradox—a cruel
paradox for Spaniards—is that Second Republic politicians,13 in their
apparent eagerness to build a democratic state based upon respect for
public freedoms (and led more by emotions than by reason), ended
up amputating one of the most important liberties: freedom of
religion and belief. It seems that those politicians were more
interested in freeing the country from religion than in establishing
the basis for freedom of religion, resembling the attitude of the
French government of the Third Republic, especially from 1880 to
1905.14 At times, the anti-religious obsession of some politicians
became grotesque. This was the case, for instance, in the peculiar
attitude shown by some leftist members of congress when the
constituent Parliament (Cortes constituyentes) discussed equal
electoral rights of Spanish citizens without making a distinction
between men and women. Some leftist congressmen expressed a
sturdy resistance to the granting of equal voting rights to women
because they presumed that women could be more easily influenced
by the clergy and would therefore constitute a “reactionary and antirepublican” force.15
In fact, the Second Republic’s lack of moderation on religious
issues was, according to a great part of historians, one of the most
decisive factors that triggered the civil war, which in turn led to a
dictatorship of more than thirty-six years. During that somber
period, Spain remained largely disconnected from the democratic
nations of Europe that, after World War II, rebuilt their economies,
their political life, and their cultural strength in a gradual process that
developed alongside a series of increasingly significant supranational
institutions. Only after Franco’s death in 1975 could Spain revive its
connection with Europe.
The religious policy of General Franco’s dictatorship produced,
as a pendulum reaction against Republican extremism, an

13. This applies especially to those aligned with left-wing parties.
14. See in this regard, in the context of an interesting comparison between the
constitutional principles on religion in France and in the United States, BLANDINE CHÉLINIPONT & JEREMY GUNN, DIEU EN FRANCE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS: QUAND LES MYTHES FONT
LA LOI 25–33 (2005).
15. See FRANCISCO MARTÍ GILABERT, POLÍTICA RELIGIOSA DE LA SEGUNDA
REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA 107–08 (1998).
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unmistakable return to the notion of a Catholic confessional State.16
The ecclesiastical establishment’s general acceptance and support of
the anti-Republican forces that won the civil war was more the result
than the cause of the violence exercised against the Church during
the Republic.17 In any event, the Catholic Church and Franco’s
dictatorship worked together for many years. The State declared
itself officially Catholic (Estado confesional), and its protection of the
Catholic Church permeated legislative and administrative praxis at all
levels, all at the cost of freedom for other religions. Once again, to
be a Catholic was, de facto, requisite to be “fully Spanish.” The
mutual concession of privileges between the Catholic Church and
the Spanish government acquired an international dimension (and
reinforcement in domestic law) with the 1953 Concordat between
the Holy See and the Spanish State.18
This reciprocal support, however, did not prevent rising tensions
between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and Franco’s regime. Tensions
rose especially in the 1960s, partially as a consequence of the Second
Vatican Council’s changing perspective on the relations between
religious and civil society. Significantly, the first Spanish law on
religious freedom, which legalized non-Catholic public religious
worship, was enacted in 1967 (despite Franco’s own reluctance) as a
consequence of political pressure exerted by the Holy See and by
Spanish bishops. The position adopted by the 1967 law was surely
insufficient according to contemporary international human rights
standards, but the regulation of religious freedom was less restrictive
than the regulation of other public liberties in Spain at the time.19

16. See generally Alberto de la Hera, Actitud del Franquismo ante la Iglesia, in IGLESIA
CATÓLICA Y REGÍMENES AUTORITARIOS Y DEMOCRÁTICOS 43–70 (1987); Pedro Lombardía,
Actitud de la Iglesia ante el Franquismo, in IGLESIA CATÓLICA Y REGÍMENES AUTORITARIOS Y
DEMOCRÁTICOS 81–102 (1987). See also GUSTAVO SUÁREZ PERTIERRA, LIBERTAD
RELIGIOSA Y CONFESIONALIDAD EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO ESPAÑOL (1978); Agustín
Motilla, Relaciones Iglesia-Estado en la España Contemporánea, REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ALCALÁ DE HENARES 91 (1991).
17. Cf. Navarro-Valls, supra note 12.
18. Concordato Entre la Santa Sede y el Estado Español, August 27, 1953 (B.O.E. Oct.
19, 1953).
19. For more on the 1967 Law on Religious Freedom within the historical context of
Spanish law and politics, see MARÍA BLANCO, LA PRIMERA LEY ESPAÑOLA DE LIBERTAD
RELIGIOSA (1999); see also Javier Tusell, El Impacto del Concilio Vaticano II en la Política y en
la Sociedad Española, in EL POSCONCILIO EN ESPAÑA 377–90 (1988); Carlos Corral,
Valoración Comparada de la Legislación Española de Libertad Religiosa, 24 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA
DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 315 (1968); José R. Polo, La Significación Histórica en España del

783

MARTINEZ-TORRON.PP2

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/12/2006 8:23:18 AM

[2006

III. THE SYSTEM DESIGNED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE ORGANIC LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The system of relations between state and religion designed by
the 1978 Constitution contrasted sharply with the record of religious
and anti-religious extremism described above. In this, as in other
aspects of Spain’s political development, the Constitution was aimed
at three fundamental objectives: a high degree of freedom, a broad
consensus among the Spanish population and political parties, and a
reasonable chance of stability, which was entirely absent in Spain’s
previous constitutional experience.
The new system of church-state relations lacked precedent in
Spain’s constitutional history and represented a true Copernican
revolution in the Spanish State’s attitude towards the role of religion
in law and in society. This new system’s novelty consisted in rejecting
a monochrome orientation (religious or secularist), while at the same
time setting down a complex plane—the main coordinate of which
was the prevailing criterion of religious freedom—and still leaving
room for institutional relations between the State and religious
denominations. In that way, the 1978 constitutional framework
endeavored to neither ignore tradition nor realism and sought for
full compatibility with international standards, particularly with the
standard that is usually deemed most strict: the European
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by its own jurisdiction,
the European Court of Strasbourg.20
Inspired by the experience of other European countries, the axis
of the Spanish church-state system was comprised of four
fundamental “informing principles” (principios informadores), which
were developed by the Organic Law on Religious Freedom a yearand-a-half after the 1978 Constitution was completed. A thorough

Concilio Vaticano II y el Derecho de Libertad Religiosa, 89 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 255 (1997–1998).
20. With regard to religious freedom case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
see generally CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (1997); LEONARD M. HAMMER, THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2001); Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael
Navarro-Valls, The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in
FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 209–38 (Tore Lindholm,
W. Cole Durham Jr. & Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004); and PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE (2005).
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analysis of those principles is beyond the limits of this paper, but it is
worthwhile here to provide an overview of the principles in order to
facilitate a better understanding of their function in the Spanish legal
system.21
The first principle is religious freedom. It means that all State law
on religious issues must aim at protecting this fundamental right,
which many international documents call “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion,”22 and which article 16 of our Constitution
names “freedom of ideology, religion and worship” (libertad
ideológica, religiosa y de culto).23 I mention this principle in the first
place not because it is necessarily in a position of hierarchical preeminence with respect to the other principles, but because religious
freedom constitutes the primary objective of the state policy in this
realm. It is a sort of lodestar that gives sense to and delineates the
true dimension of the other constitutional principles. These other
principles, however, cannot be conceived simply as mere
developments of the principle of religious freedom. On the contrary,
the other three principles clearly define and cement the functional
efficiency of religious liberty in Spanish legal order.24
The second principle is equality and requires that all citizens and
groups are equal before the law with respect to the exercise of religion
or belief. The equality principle’s immediate consequence is that the
same degree of freedom must be recognized for all, but it also acts as a
limit to the general rules governing the legal position of churches in
Spain. Thus, differences between the legal statuses of various religious

21. There are many sources that refer to the constitutional principles on religious issues
in Spanish law. For a more detailed exposition of the ideas mentioned in the following
paragraphs, and for further bibliographical references, see JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN,
RELIGIÓN, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD, ANTIGUOS Y NUEVOS PLANTEAMIENTOS EN EL DERECHO
ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 172–204 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess. at art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European
Convention on Human Rights art. 9 (1950).
23. We could also add the expression “freedom of religion or belief,” which has been
gaining ground since the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, especially within the OSCE environment.
With regard to the conceptual questions implied in the use of that diverse terminology, see
MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra, note 21, at 126–39.
24. See Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los Principios Constitucionales del Derecho Eclesiástico como
Sistema, in LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO: ESTUDIOS EN MEMORIA DEL
PROFESOR PEDRO LOMBARDÍA 309–22 (1989).
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denominations are legitimate only if they are not the result of
discrimination. Such differences are allowed only if it is necessary for a
specific legal treatment to be adjusted to the particular circumstances of
a particular group. In other words, according to the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights and of the Spanish Constitutional
Court, the differences that are legitimate are those which correspond to
a reasonable and objective justification, pursue a legitimate aim, and
maintain a correct relationship of proportionality between the aim
pursued and the means employed.25 Equality is perhaps the principle
most difficult to apply in practice—in this, as in other areas of
constitutional law—for there is not always a clear border marking the
end of what is open to the discretion of public authorities and the
beginning of what is obliged by law.
The third principle is that of state neutrality26 on religious matters
and appears to be the main instrument chosen by the Constitution to
protect the religious liberty of all citizens and groups in equal
conditions. Neutrality requires that the State and its legal system
perceive themselves as incompetent with regard to purely religious
questions and therefore unable to make value judgments on them.
However, it does not mean that civil authorities declare themselves
indifferent towards the results of freedom of religion or belief, or that
they withdraw completely from the content of personal choices in this

25. The case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court is directly inspired by the case law
of the Court of Strasbourg. The first decision of the European Court of Human Rights
establishing its doctrine on equality was the so-called “linguistic Belgian case”: Case “relating
to certain aspects on the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium (July
23, 1968), especially in ‘The Law’ n.1.B.10. The European Court has subsequently reiterated
this doctrine in numerous decisions, including some relating to religious freedom. See Javier
Martínez-Torrón, La Protección Internacional de la Libertad Religiosa, in TRATADO DE
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 229–37 (1994). For an explanation of the principle of equality in the
case law of the Constitutional Court of Spain, see JOAQUÍN CALVO ÁLVAREZ, LOS PRINCIPIOS
DEL
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL EN LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUCIONAL 129–64 (1999); see also RAFAEL RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, EL FACTOR
RELIGIOSO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 33–38 (1992).
26. Some scholars prefer the terms ‘laicity” (laicidad, laïcité) or “aconfessionality.” The
use of one or the other term implies certain differences with regard to how the meaning of this
principle is understood. Personally, I prefer the expression “neutrality,” which I deem more
appropriate to avoid misunderstandings with respect to its content. See JAVIER MARTÍNEZTORRÓN, supra note 21. For a discussion on state neutrality and its connections with the
notion of religious freedom and with the very notion of person, see the interesting remarks
written, in the light of German jurisprudence, by María J. Roca, La Neutralidad del Estado:
Fundamento Doctrinal y Delimitación en la Jurisprudencia, in I IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO
405 (1997).
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particular area of human rationality. Neutrality means that when the
State acts with respect to diverse religions, it may take into account
only the social effects of the religious activity, including the cases in
which those effects conflict with values that the legal order considers
necessary.
Finally, the principle of state cooperation with churches or religious
communities provides a specific profile to neutrality. State and churches
enjoy, of course, reciprocal autonomy.27 Nevertheless, this autonomy is
not understood in terms of strict separation but rather in terms of
amicable relations and mutual cooperation (at least, cooperation of the
State with religious denominations). This principle poses an interesting
and difficult question: to what extent may a concrete measure of State
cooperation with churches depend on each church’s cooperation with
the State (not, of course, with a particular government)? Or, in other
words, may State cooperation depend upon a religious community’s
loyalty to the constitutional values of a democratic State? This issue is
closely connected to the relationship between what German scholars
have called Rechtstreue and Staatstreue (fidelity to the law and fidelity
to the State).28 In any event, two aspects of the principle of
cooperation seem indisputable: first, the Constitution imposes on the
State a general duty to cooperate with religion, according to “the
beliefs of Spanish society”;29 and second, State cooperation with

27. Naturally, not only is the state autonomous with regard to religion—no matter how
widespread it is in society—but also religious communities are autonomous with respect to the
state. The European Court of Human Rights has often emphasized this idea in recent years,
especially in the decisions Serif v. Greece (Dec. 14, 1999), Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 511
Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (Oct. 2000), Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldavia (Dec. 2001),
and Agga v. Greece (Oct. 17, 2002). For a further explanation of this doctrine, see Javier
Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587 (2005).
28. This issue was analyzed by the German Constitutional Court in a decision made on
December 19, 2000, relating to the requirements that Jehovah’s Witnesses had to meet to be
granted the status of “public law corporation.” BverfGE 102, 370 Nr. 17 (F.R.G.). See
Christian Hillgruber, Der Körperschaftsstatus von Religionsgemeinschaften: Objektives
Grundverhältnis oder subjektives Grundrecht, in NVWZ 1347 (2001); Alexander Hollerbach,
Anmerkung, in JZ 1117 (1997); Stefan Korioth, Loyalität im Staatskirchenrecht? Geschriebene
und ungeschriebene Voraussetzungen des Körperschaftsstatus nach Art. 140 GG i.V.m. Art. 137
Abs. 5 WRV, in RECHTSTHEORIE UND RECHTSDOGMATIK IM AUSTAUSCH.
GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR BERND JEAND’HEUR 221–45 (1999); Gerhard Robbers, Sinn und
Zweck der Körperschaftsstatus im Staatskirchenrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MARTIN HECKEL
411–25 (1999).
29. C.E., supra note 6, art. 16(3).
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churches probably allows a certain margin of appreciation for public
authorities, albeit limited by the principles of equality and neutrality.
IV. THREE KEY ASPECTS OF THE SPANISH TRANSITION
I would now like to emphasize three aspects of the
reconstruction process of church-state relations during Spain’s
transition to democracy that should not be forgotten. They are
significant not only to duly evaluate the meaning of the political
change of the 1970s, but they also can continue to shed light on the
possible future development of the Spanish church-state system.
A. The Support of Ecclesiastical Hierarchy
I have already noted that the renovation of the Spanish model of
relations between state and religion was essential for the success of
Spain’s democratic evolution. A large part of this success was due to
the support that the vast majority of Spanish bishops gave to the
political change.30
The triumph and subsequent consolidation of democracy in
Spain required, as an indispensable condition, a situation of
“religious peace,” which could be reached only by careful avoidance
of extreme solutions. Otherwise, there was the risk that fears of a
“new Second Republic” would condemn Spain again to a period of
political stagnation of one color or other. The representatives of
those political positions barred during Franco’s regime had a
responsibility to keep away from encouraging the same sentiments of
requital that so easily emerged in the Republican Constitution and
laws. This was well understood by some politicians who had been
witnesses—and even protagonists—of the Republican excesses and
their tragic results in 1936.31
30. In addition to the reference works cited in note 8, a detailed description of the
attitude of the Catholic Church in those years, with numerous references to news in mass
media, can be found in AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, supra note 7, at 74–87, 99–111.
31. This explains the attitude of Santiago Carrillo, who was the Secretary General of the
Spanish Communist Party while the Constitution was being debated in Parliament. He had
been directly involved in some serious revolutionary episodes in 1934 and had held the
position of “commissary of public order” within the Republic’s Committee of Defense during
the civil war. Carrillo, during the parliamentary debates, expressed his support of the explicit
mention of the Catholic Church in art. 16 of the Constitution (while the Socialist Party argued
against it). He considered that mentioning the Church did not confer improperly any privilege
nor set the basis for a sort of “sociological confessionality” of the state. It simply recognized
the incontestable social fact that the vast majority of the population professed Catholicism,
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But above all, the Catholic Church in Spain had the
responsibility to understand—and to help a large part of the
population and many influential elements of society understand—
that the end of the State’s Catholic confessionality would not
necessarily provoke a pendulum movement in the opposite direction,
which could lead (as it did in the 1930s) to the hostility of public
authorities towards the Church. The influence of ecclesiastical
hierarchy and institutions was then, even more than now,
extraordinarily extensive and intense. Their comprehension and
acceptance of the new design of relations between state and religion
was indispensable for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it was
essential because without the ecclesiastical hierarchy’s collaboration,
it would have been impossible to reach the “religious peace”
required for the political consensus that Spain’s democratic transition
needed. On the other hand, it was similarly essential because the
hierarchy and Church institutions supported the democratic process
itself and presented it to Catholics as something not merely
inevitable, but actually positive, for Spain. This was especially
important since a significant part of the vital forces of Spanish
society, including a large percentage of high ranking Army officers,
were not sympathetic to the political change, and, for several years,
the future of Spain’s democracy was not completely secure, as the
failed coup d’état of February 23, 1981, demonstrated.
The immense majority of social and political forces accepted
almost unconditionally the new legal framework of religious freedom
in Spain. This support was aided by the unambiguous assent of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, which had been tranquillized by the
negotiation of a new concordat during the parliamentary debates on
the Constitution. This assent was of utmost importance for a
political transition which was as peaceful as it was natural; indeed,
surprisingly natural, in view of Spain’s turbulent political past up to
that point.
It is also worth noting that the active cooperation of the Catholic
Church in Spain during that decisive time was not the mere product
of political convenience nor the result of resigned submission to an
inexorable destiny. On the contrary, it had profound roots in the

while at the same time tranquillizing the ecclesiastical hierarchy and helping to remove the
‘ghosts of the past,’ which had been revived in the course of the constitutional debate in
Parliament. See AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, supra note 7, at 128–33.
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renewal of Catholic doctrine regarding relations between the Church
and civil society, which began taking shape during the Second
Vatican Council and materialized in the Declaration Dignitatis
Humanae. This was the same doctrinal renovation that drove the
enactment of the first Spanish law on religious freedom during
Franco’s dictatorship in 1967.32
B. Consideration of Religion as a Positive Social Phenomenon
As indicated before, our constitutional system of church-state
relations understands state neutrality not as a strict separation, but
rather as compatible with an affirmative cooperation with religion.
This is no anomaly. On the contrary, it is a frequent choice—with
various nuances—in the European panorama, with the exceptions of
France and Turkey (due to particular historical circumstances of the
two countries).33
It is not my intention to analyze the consequences of the
principle of State cooperation at political and legal levels. But I
would like to draw attention to the fact that the principle of
cooperation implies two presuppositions with respect to the way that
the Constitution conceives public authorities’ attitudes towards
religion.
First, religion is appreciated as a positive social phenomenon. It is
primarily considered a reality that contributes more to the
improvement of society than to conflict or social concern (although,
sometimes, some religions are conflictive). This perception is based
on the fact that institutionalized religions, in addition to expressing
the exercise of a fundamental right, actually play a positive role in
society, which is visible in different domains.34 These include some
areas that are not easily quantifiable, in particular the development of
civic virtues. To be a good citizen requires a high degree of ethical
32. See supra part II.
33. For a succinct and expressive description of the diverse church-state systems in the
European Union, see STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Gerhard Robbers ed.,
2d ed. 2005).
34. See generally, for instance, from diverse perspectives, Rafael Navarro-Valls, Justicia
constitucional y factor religioso, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y DE CONCIENCIA ANTE LA JUSTICIA
CONSTITUCIONAL 25, 25–38 (Javier Martínez-Torrón ed., 1998); SALVATORE BERLINGÒ, ENTI E
BENI RELIGIOSI IN ITALIA 21 (1992); ANTONIO VITALE, CORSO DI DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO
ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO E INERESSI RELIGIOSI 8, 28 (6th ed. 1992); and, within the context of
a critical revision of the judicial interpretation of U.S. Establishment Clause, Mary A. Glendon &
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991).
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quality in a wide range of aspects: from the moral individual
obligation to abide by the law, to a variety of manifestations of what
today is usually called solidarity. Religions normally provide
motivations for individual moral development that transcend
material reality and that tend to be, in practice, quite efficient
(sometimes probably more efficient than the sole fear of an often
infrequent legal penalty).
Moreover, the positive social function of religion embraces other
more quantifiable aspects. It is sufficient to note that the vast
majority of non-governmental organizations are of direct or indirect
religious inspiration. This is no surprise; initiatives of social assistance
founded upon Christian charity, or upon its equivalent in other
religions, attract many more people than mere altruism without a
clear spiritual basis, no matter how sophisticated altruism’s
intellectual elaboration may be.35
As a consequence of what I have suggested in the preceding
paragraphs, the second presupposition of the principle of State
cooperation is that religion is accepted as a “normal” element of
public life. To profess either religious or non-religious belief is not
merely a private affair of citizens. Institutionalized religions, whose
rights are founded on individual rights to religious freedom, are
entitled to express and spread their ideas in the public square, in
every sphere of human activity—from education, culture, or science,
to non-profit activities, mass media, and even politics. This is, of
course, compatible with the Spanish Constitutional Court’s
reasonable doctrine concerning the need to carefully avoid any
confusion between state and religious functions.36 Assuming there is
no such confusion, the prevailing criterion will be the right of
individual citizens and of religious denominations to manifest their
religion or their belief “in public or private.”37 Generally, this is not

35. This is a theme that has not always drawn the attention it deserves—something
which is paradoxical in Western societies, increasingly concerned about fostering solidarity with
persons or minority groups in physically, culturally, or socially disadvantageous situations. It is
worth noting that this concern for fostering solidarity, in turn, derives from an ethical interest
with clear religious roots. The perspective of law and economics would help to illuminate the
strictly secular reasons for the principle of State cooperation with religion and the legal
application of this principle. It would be extremely interesting to have consistent and detailed
studies on the impact of religion on economy (or, to be precise, on the money that religions
save the welfare State).
36. Cf. Spanish Constitutional Court, STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 24).
37. Cf. European Convention on Human Rights art. 9(1) (1950). This raises an issue
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difficult to accept in the abstract. Many of the occasional interpretive
problems in its practical application come from an erroneous
identification between the terms “public” and “state,” which leads to
an improper attribution to the State of a sort of monopoly over the
control of public life.
C. Regulation of Specific Instruments for State Cooperation
When the LOLR developed article 16 of the Constitution in
1980, it went beyond designing a common legal framework for all
religions in Spain that included a special registry for recognizing the
legal personality of religious groups.38 The law also created specific
instruments to materialize State cooperation with religious
denominations in accordance with a prudent interpretation of the
equality principle. One such instrument is the Advisory Commission
on Religious Freedom (Comisión Asesora de Libertad Religiosa),39 a
consultative body within the Ministry of Justice that integrates
representatives of religious communities with officials of different
State departments and with renowned experts (most often, in
practice, university professors). Other, even more significant
instruments are the formal cooperation agreements or covenants
between the State and churches (acuerdos o convenios de
cooperación).40 These agreements constitute an innovation of the
utmost importance that is without precedent in Spanish law but was

that has acquired increasing significance not only in Spain but also in the entire Western world:
the use of religious symbols in public spaces. This is an extremely complex issue, as
demonstrated by the two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for the case Leyla
Sahin v. Turkey on June 29, 2004 (Chamber) and Nov. 10, 2005 (Grand Chamber) (the case
relates to the Turkish prohibition to wear the Islamic headscarf at a university). See Natan
Lerner, How Wide the Margin of Appreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the Strasbourg
Court, and Secularist Tolerance, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 65 (2005); see also
StrasbourgConference.org, http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers.php (containing
various papers relating to the use of religious symbols in public places) (last visited July 22,
2006). For a precise and recent analysis of the many aspects of the issue of religious symbols in
Spanish and comparative law, see SANTIAGO CAÑAMARES, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA, SIMBOLOGÍA
Y LAICIDAD DEL ESTADO (2005).
38. This refers to the Registry of Religious Entities, which was created by LOLR art. 5
and regulated by the Royal Decree 142/1981, Jan. 9, 1981 (sobre organización y
funcionamiento del Registro de Entidades Religiosas).
39. See LOLR, supra note 6, art. 8. The Commission is currently regulated by the Royal
Decree 1159/2001, Oct. 26, 2001 (por el que se regula la Comisión Asesora de Libertad
Religiosa).
40. LOLR, supra note 6, art. 7.
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instead inspired by German and Italian law and created as a
consequence of the maintenance of the Spanish tradition of
concordats after the 1978 Constitution.
In Spain, concordats with the Catholic Church have a history
that dates back to the eighteenth century. The main milestones were
the Concordats of 1753,41 1851, and 1953.42 Initially, they were
conceived—in the context of a Catholic monarchy of regalist
orientation—as a formal channel for the reciprocal concession of
privileges between Church and State, with a particular emphasis on
the right of patronage (ius patronatus) and on the regulation of
ecclesiastical offices and benefices. With the passage of time,
concordats evolved toward a bilateral norm, always with the rank of
an international treaty and aimed at determining more
comprehensively the legal status of the Catholic Church in Spain.
This is clearly visible in the Concordat of 1953, in which we can still
observe the protectionist attitude of the State and the Church’s
disposition to grant concessions in ecclesiastical matters.
The Concordat signed under Franco’s regime could have been
appropriate for a State that was confessional (officially Catholic) and
non-democratic, but it could not be maintained in a State toward
which Spain’s political transition was moving. Both the government
and the Church soon felt the need to replace the 1953 Concordat.
Thus, an Agreement between the Holy See and the Spanish State
was signed on July 28, 1976, hardly a few months after Francisco
Franco’s death in November of 1975. The Agreement’s preamble
was very expressive, indicating,

41. As precedents within the 18th century, we could cite the Agreement of 1717 and
the Concordat of 1737. Both were soon abandoned for not fully satisfying the interests of the
Spanish Crown.
42. See JUAN PÉREZ ALHAMA, LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO ESPAÑOL: ESTUDIO HISTÓRICO
A TRAVÉS DEL CONCORDATO DE 1851 (1967); Juan L. Acebal Luján, El Concordato de 1953,
21 SALMANTENSIS 353 (1974); José Maldonado & Fernández del Torco, Los primeros años de
vigencia del Concordato de 1953, 12 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 7 (1957);
Isidoro Martín Martínez, En el segundo centenario del Concordato español de 1753, 8 REVISTA
ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 745 (1953); María E. Buqueras Segura, Posición del
Episcopado español ante la revisión del Concordato de 1953, 45 IUS CANONICUM 367 (1983);
Federico Suárez, Génesis del Concordato de 1851, III IUS CANONICUM 65 (1963). Other
interesting works are the collective volumes EL CONCORDATO DE 1953 (1956) and LA
INSTITUCIÓN CONCORDATARIA EN LA ACTUALIDAD: TRABAJOS DE LA XIII SEMANA DE
DERECHO CANÓNICO (1971).
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The Holy See and the Spanish Government, in view of the
profound process of transformation that Spanish society has
experienced in the last years, also with respect to relationships
between the political community and religious denominations as
well as between the Catholic Church and the State . . . judge it
necessary to regulate, through specific Agreements, the matters of
common interest that require a new order according to the new
circumstances arisen after the signature of the Concordat of 27
August 1953; and therefore they agree to undertake in common
the study of those diverse matters with the purpose of reaching, as
soon as possible, the conclusion of Agreements that replace
gradually the relevant provisions of the Concordat currently in
force.43

This text shows that neither the Church nor the State questioned
that church-state relations should be governed by a concordat. What
they had in mind was the need to design a new juridical bilateral
framework, compatible with the constitutional principles that, after
their elaboration in Parliament, would constitute the basis for the
new Spanish democracy according to the December 1978
Constitution. Indeed, the Agreement of 1976 suppressed the two
main privileges that symbolized the church-state relations pervading
the Concordat of 1953: the benefit of clergy, on the part of the
Church, and the right of presentation of bishops, on the part of the
State.44 Above all, this early and partial Agreement was the opening
of negotiations that, carried out in parallel with the drafting of the
Constitution in Parliament, would conclude with the signature of
four specific Agreements—which together form a concordat—on
January 3, 1979, one week after the Constitution was promulgated.45
43. Acuerdo sobre renuncia a la presentación de obispos y al privilegio del fuero, July 28,
1976 (Instrumento de ratificación of Aug. 19, 1976, B.O.E. Sept. 24, 1976). The transcribed
excerpt of the preamble has been translated by the author from the original Spanish version.
44. The benefit of clergy has a very ancient origin and consisted in the exemption of
clerics from criminal prosecution in the secular courts without the previous authorization of
the relevant bishop. For the history of this institution in English and American law, see
GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS (1955) and
LEONA C. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1929).
The right of presentation of bishops given to Franco was reminiscent of the old right of
patronage of the Spanish monarchy. The Holy See agreed that, when a diocese became vacant,
the new bishop had to be appointed out of three names provided by the government. This
system obliged negotiation of every appointment of residential bishops in Spain and granted
the government the possibility of vetoing certain persons for being politically objectionable.
45. See Beatriz Castillo, El proceso de revisión del Concordato de 1953, in ESCRITOS EN
HONOR DE JAVIER HERVADA 971, 971–85 (special vol. of IUS CANONICUM 1999); JUAN
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The framework created by the 1979 concordat thus constituted
the first juridical materialization of the constitutional principle of
State cooperation with religion. This initial experience was closely
linked to Spanish political and legal tradition. And the same
experience, interpreted from the perspective of the principles of
equality and neutrality, would move the legislature a year-and-a-half
later to introduce into the LOLR a significant and innovative
element in Spain’s traditional system of sources of law. An adapted
version of the concordats with the Catholic Church was made
available to other religious denominations.46 The 1980 LOLR took,
as a point of reference, the analogous pre-existing institutions in
German and Italian law (the Kirchenverträge and the intese,
respectively), and added a few nuances. The most important is
perhaps the element of “well-known roots” (notorio arraigo), which
is the key criterion employed to determine the religious
denominations that may be entitled to a formal cooperation
agreement with the State because of their social rooting.47
If we look at the twenty-five years since the enactment of the
LOLR, we may perhaps think that cooperation agreements have
been an under-utilized institution thus far. Only three agreements
have been concluded, with three federations of religious
communities: Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic. All of them, each very
similar in content, were approved by statute on November 10,
1992.48 Moreover, neither the history of the negotiation process49
FORNÉS, EL NUEVO SISTEMA CONCORDATARIO ESPAÑOL: LOS ACUERDOS DE 1976 Y 1979
(1980); José M. Vázquez García-Peñuela, Examen de las relaciones entre la Santa Sede y el
Estado Español: desde el Concordato de 1953 a los acuerdos de 1979, in PLURALISMO RELIGIOSO
Y ESTADO DE DERECHO 89, 89–161 (2004); Daniel Tirapu, Acuerdos Iglesia-Estado en España,
in EUROPA: UNA REALIDAD EN CAMINO 185, 185–208 (1991).
46. See JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, SEPARATISMO Y COOPERACIÓN EN LOS ACUERDOS
DEL ESTADO CON LAS MINORÍAS RELIGIOSAS 20–36 (1994).
47. The expression “well-known roots” is an approximate translation of the Spanish
term notorio arraigo, which is utilized by LOLR art. 7. For possible meanings of this new and
peculiar concept of Spanish law, see MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 46, at 88–95; see also
María J. Villa Robledo, Reflexiones en torno al concepto de ‘notorio arraigo’ en el art. 7 de la Ley
Orgánica de libertad religiosa, 1 ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 143
(1985).
48. See 24/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España,
FEREDE); 25/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España, FCI);
26/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Comisión Islámica de España, CIE); see also DAVID GARCÍA-PARDO,
EL SISTEMA DE ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES MINORITARIAS EN ESPAÑA E ITALIA
(1999); JOAQUÍN MANTECÓN, LOS ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO CON LAS CONFESIONES
ACATÓLICAS: TEXTOS, COMENTARIOS Y BIBLIOGRAFÍA (1995); AGUSTÍN MOTILLA, LOS
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nor the criteria for determining the notion of “well-know roots” for
legal purposes50 casts much light on the future of this institution in
our legal system. An analogous ambiguity permeates governmental
decisions on subsequent applications for recognition of “well-known
roots,” which is an indispensable legal requirement to initiate the
negotiation of a cooperation agreement with the State. Indeed, apart
from the federations that were parties in the 1992 Agreements, only
two religious denominations have obtained this recognition, and
they have had to wait a long time for it in spite of their large number
of followers and of their spreading all over Spanish territory: the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Church of the
Christian Jehovah's Witnesses.51
In spite of these possible deficiencies, the prompt signature of
the Concordat with the Holy See after the approval of the 1978
Constitution has had a positive influence on the legal status of
religious minorities. This fact, although pointed out by some
scholars soon after the LOLR was enacted,52 has been disregarded in
the last years in an atmosphere often inundated by minority
religions’ spiral of claims alleging inequality. The 1979 Concordat
did not imply the continuation of unjustified privileges in favor of
the Catholic Church and to the detriment of other churches. On the
contrary, it contributed to a broad interpretation of the

ACUERDOS ENTRE EL ESTADO Y LAS CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL
(1985); Jorge Otaduy, Los Proyectos de acuerdo de cooperación con las Iglesias evangélicas y las
comunidades israelitas, in QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 138 (1991–
1992); ANTONIO VIANA, LOS ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS Y EL PRINCIPIO
DE IGUALDAD (1985); ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL CON CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS
MINORITARIAS (Víctor Reina & María A. Félix eds., 1996); ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL
CON LOS JUDÍOS, MUSULMANES Y PROTESTANTES (1994).
49. See ANA FERNÁNDEZ-CORONADO, ESTADO Y CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS: UN
NUEVO MODELO DE RELACIÓN: (LOS PACTOS CON LAS CONFESIONES: LEYES 24, 25 Y 26 DE
1992) (1995) (explaining the negotiations surrounding the Agreements of 1992).
50. Significantly, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), in its opinion about the draft
agreements delivered to the Ministry of Justice on January 31, 1991 (consideración jurídica I),
expressed its regret for the fact that the government had not provided any explanation on the
criteria utilized for the recognition of “well-known roots” to the three religious federations.
51. The Ministry of Justice’s Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom recognized
the “well-known roots” of the LDS Church on April 23, 2003. The same commission
recognized the "well-know roots" of Jehovah's Witnesses on June 29, 2006, by a very tight
decision and after a controverted debate, in part caused by the unclear role that this sort of
recognition has to play—and is playing—in Spanish law.
52. See Pedro J. Viladrich, Los principios informadores del Derecho eclesiástico español, in
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 292 (1980).
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constitutional principle of cooperation that has been beneficial for at
least some religious minorities. In other words, the Concordat was
the crucial factor that moved LOLR’s drafters to extend to other
religious communities the possibility of regulating their basic legal
status with a bilateral instrument similar to the concordats,53 which
had been for more than two centuries exclusively available to the
Catholic Church. Thus, rather than perpetuating inequalities
between the major church and minority churches, the postconstitutional continuation of concordats in Spain helped create a
specific channel of State cooperation: formal agreements between
State and religious denominations, which imply an open process of
legislative negotiation. In practice, this channel has produced a great
deal of State cooperation with a plurality of religious minorities (an
open plurality, not a closed list) that perhaps would have been
inconceivable without the precedent of the 1979 Concordat with the
Catholic Church.54
In effect, the application of LOLR article 7 in 1992 to the
federations of Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic communities put
various modes of State cooperation at the disposal of religious
minorities with particular rooting in Spain, thus making their legal
status not very dissimilar to that of the Catholic Church. This is
positive considering that State cooperation, in reality, constitutes a
way to promote the right to religious freedom of “individuals and
communities.”55 This, in turn, fits perfectly within the constitutional
mandate given to public authorities by article 9 of the Constitution,
which attempts to “promote the necessary conditions to ensure that
the liberty and equality of individuals and of the groups in which
they integrate may be real and effective,” and to “remove the
obstacles that prevent or hinder their full exercise.”56
Among these aspects of State cooperation, it is worth briefly
mentioning the following here:

53. See CIÁURRIZ, supra note 7, at 168–70.
54. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, Concordato, cooperación e igualdad: La cooperación del
Estado español con las confesiones religiosas a la luz del vigente sistema de acuerdos con la Iglesia
católica, in LOS CONCORDATOS: PASADO Y FUTURO 471, 471–88 (J.M. Vázquez GarcíaPeñuela ed., 2004).
55. C.E., supra note 6, art. 16(1) (author’s translation).
56. Id. art. 9(2).
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1. Civil effects of religious marriage
The law recognizes the civil effects of a religious marriage of
denominations with a cooperation agreement; there are some
differences between Catholic marriage and other types of religious
marriage.57 The main difference is that the decisions of the Catholic
ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the nullity or dissolution of marriages are
given civil effects, while similar effects are not granted to other
religious jurisdictions in Spain. Naturally, the civil effects of the
religious regulation of marriage are subject to the limitations derived
from public order (which tend to be less and less significant because
of the evolution of Spanish law on marriage and family, which has
apparently moved toward a gradual privatization of the contract of
civil marriage).58
2. Religious education in public schools
Confessional teaching of religion in public schools also varies
when we compare Catholic religious education with Protestant,
Jewish, or Islamic education, although there is a trend towards their
gradual convergence following the pattern applicable to the Catholic
Church (which is itself under reform). Religious education has been
one of the most conflictive issues between the ecclesiastical hierarchy
and the Spanish government in the last twenty-five years, with
different levels of political tension depending on the government.
This is due in part to the terms of the 1979 Agreement on
Education and Cultural Affairs between the Holy See and the
Spanish State. It is also due in part to the attitude of some
governments, which have at times emphasized the merely “private”
nature of religious education, neither realizing its social contribution
from a secular perspective (beyond the obvious interest the churches
have in it) nor sufficiently perceiving the implications of this issue
57. See MARIANO LÓPEZ ALARCÓN & RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS, CURSO DE DERECHO
MATRIMONIAL CANÓNICO Y CONCORDADO 445–515 (6th ed. 2001) (providing precise and
detailed analysis of the civil effects of religious marriage in Spanish law).
58. A particularly significant step in this direction has been taken recently with the
enactment of the controversial Law 13/2005, July 1, 2005 (por la que se modifica el Código
Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio), which eliminates heterosexuality as a
necessary element of marriage. Naturally, this law, and the arguments alleged for its enactment,
paves the way for other conceptions or public order in the area of marriage that are still more
restrictive; conceptions that, for instance, would suppress the limitations deriving from
monogamy or from the traditional prohibition of incestuous marriages.
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with regard to parents’ constitutional right to ensure that “their
children receive a religious and moral formation in accordance with
their own beliefs.”59 The discrepancies between the Bishops’
Conference and the current socialist government undermine the
possibility of reaching a clear and prompt social consensus on this
issue. On the other hand, with regard in particular to the religious
teaching of Muslim students in public centers, the specter of a
potential infiltration of Islamic extremism has recently added an
element of distrust and social tension in this area.60
3. Religious assistance in public centers such as military quarters,
hospitals, penitentiaries, retirement homes, or asylums
Once again, we find here a few differences between Catholic
religious assistance and other religions’ assistance, which are justified
by the very unequal percentages of the population that declare
themselves believers of certain religions. It does not seem feasible to
apply to all religious denominations the same scheme of permanent
Catholic Chaplaincies, but, at the same time, the system designed to
facilitate the assistance of the faithful of those religions included in
the 1992 Agreements’ system is certainly underdeveloped. Indeed,
for years the Ministry of Justice has been searching for a more
adequate solution to serve its purpose more efficiently than the
current system of “free access” and “free exit” (whereby religious
ministers may freely enter public centers when their spiritual
assistance is required, and, when appropriate, people in military

59. C.E., supra note 6, art. 27(3) (author’s translation).
60. For a brief but clear description and analysis of the questions raised by religious
education in Spain, see Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero, Religious Education in the Spanish
School System, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 561 (2004) and Javier Martínez-Torrón, School and
Religion in Spain, 47 J. CHURCH & ST. 133 (2005). The situation became more conflictive
after the Spanish Congress approved the Organic Law on Education (Ley Orgánica de la
Educación) on April 6, 2006, which was proposed by our current government and rejected the
amendments introduced by the Senate, which were aimed at restoring the religious education
system established by the preceding legislature, contained in the Organic Law 10/2002, Dec.
12, 2002 (de Calidad de la Educación), which was never put into practice because the current
government suspended its application as soon as it came to power. While the draft law was
discussed at the Congress in its first stage, there was a strong popular reaction against it, visibly
expressed in a massive demonstration held in Madrid on November 12, 2005. The text
approved by the Senate can be found in BOLETÍN OFICIAL DE LAS CORTES GENERALES–
SENADO, serie II, núm. 38(f), 513–89 (Mar. 30, 2006). The final discussion by the Congress,
and the reasons alleged to reject the Senate’s amendments, can be found in DIARIO DE
SESIONES DEL CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS, núm. 169, 8432–46 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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centers or in homes are authorized to leave the place to attend
religious worship). The solution is expected to include paying
religious ministers for their services with state funds, as is done with
Catholic chaplains.61
4. State economic cooperation with religious denominations
This type of cooperation is channeled especially through three
legal instruments: tax exemptions for religious denominations, tax
benefits for donations made to religious entities by individuals or by
corporations, and direct economic aid. In the two first categories,
there has been a gradual and clear convergence of the scheme
designed for the Catholic Church and the one applicable to
Protestants, Jews, and Muslims. However, the only beneficiary of
direct economic aid from the State has traditionally been the
Catholic Church.
The current system is called “tax assignment” (asignación
tributaria), which gives taxpayers the option of allocating 0.5239
percent of their income tax to the economic maintenance of the
Catholic Church; taxpayers express their will in that regard every year
when filling out the relevant forms for the Spanish Internal Revenue
Service and the money is administered by the Bishops’ Conference.
Because of flaws in the effective functioning of the system, the
Ministry of Justice is currently studying a possible revision.62 One of
the alternatives under consideration is raising the percentage of the
income tax that taxpayers can freely assign, as the Bishops’
Conference insists that the current percentage is insufficient. Another
important change under study is the possible extension of tax
61. The Ministry of Justice is currently studying a possible regulation on Protestant,
Jewish, and Islamic religious assistance in penitentiaries (and perhaps in other public centers).
See LOS ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES MINORITARIAS: DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA (Joaquín
Mantecón ed., 2003) [hereinafter DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA] (explaining issues related to the
practical application of the 1992 Agreements). This volume gathers several papers requested by
the previous government’s Ministry of Justice from university professors who were members of
the Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom. It had the aim of studying proposals of
possible reforms of the provisions contained in the 1992 Agreements with the Evangelical,
Jewish, and Islamic federations. Along with those papers, the book also transcribes the
comments written by other members of the Advisory Commission. Those addressed by the
representatives of the religious federations are particularly interesting, for they provide the
perspective of the people to whom the agreements are applied. The materials of that volume
constituted, and still constitute under the current government, a source of reflection for the
legislative reforms under study.
62. See id.
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assignment to the religious federations that signed the 1992
Agreements. Those federations initially rejected the system when the
government offered it during negotiations but have recently
expressed interest in its availability, or at least in receiving some sort
of direct economic aid from the State.63 While the necessary changes
in tax laws are affected, the current government has decided to erect
a public foundation named “Pluralism and Coexistence” (Pluralismo
y Convivencia) that aims to provide public financial support to
Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic federations through funding activities
relating to education, culture, or social integration. Curiously
enough, this new way of providing economic aid to major religious
minorities in Spain has similarities to the old system of budgetary
funding (dotación presupuestaria) applied to the Catholic Church.
Under this system, part of the State budget was reserved every year
for the expenses of “worship and clergy.” Significantly, both the
Holy See and the Spanish State, in the 1979 Agreement on
Economic Affairs, thought it preferable to abandon the budgetary
funding system, understanding that it was less adequate for the new
political era that was opening in Spain.64

63. The Islamic federation was always in favor of the tax assignment system.
Nevertheless, because they joined the negotiation process of the 1992 Agreements after the
Protestants and Jews, they had to accept the refusal expressed by the Protestants and Jews
because the government was determined not to distinguish between the three federations in
this area. Recently, the Evangelical and Islamic federations have declared that they are in favor
of adopting the tax assignment. On the contrary, the Jewish federation has blatantly opposed
receiving money from the state via tax assignment and prefers other channels of direct state
funding that do not require citizens to provide personal and signed statements. See id. at 152–
53, 192–94, 213. The alleged reason is the distrust that many Jews have of identifying
themselves as such, due to their memory of the perverse historical use of Jewish censuses in
many countries in the past. Obviously, recent anti-Semitic movements in various countries will
not help to reduce that distrust. These movements are more significant in Spain than one
might think at first glance. See Eugenia Relaño Pastor, España contra el antisemitismo, racismo,
xenofobia y otras formas de intolerancia: una panorámica general, 9 REVISTA GENERAL DE
DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 1 (2005), available at
www.iustel.com.
64. See Acuerdo sobre Asuntos Económicos, Jan. 3, 1979, pmbl., art. II (Instrumento de
ratificación of Dec. 4, 1979, B.O.E. Dec. 15, 1979). The Foundation Pluralismo y
Convivencia was constituted by the Ministry of Justice on January 25, 2005, and registered via
the Order ECI/935/2005, Mar. 8, 2005 (B.O.E. 2005). See Carmen Garcimartín Montero,
Direct Financing of Religious Denominations in Spain, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 175 (2006)
(analyzing this foundation in light of the diverse systems of state aid to religion in Spain).
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V. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER
What can we say twenty-five years after the enactment of the
Organic Law on Religious Freedom? A general judgment would
likely lead us to affirm that the system it set up has functioned
reasonably well in the context of comparative law. However, no legal
system of church-state relations is perfect; perfection in the law is not
easily attainable.
As a matter of fact, several religious denominations have raised a
series of grievances and claims. It is natural that churches and
religious communities—particularly those attentive to manifestations
of the principle of state cooperation—tend to defend their legitimate
interests and, consequently, put more emphasis on the system’s
deficiencies than on its achievements. Though it is useful to listen to
their voices—for they may point out imperfection in our system, thus
facilitating its potential improvement—we must not let them
condition our perspective of analysis. Our examination must
necessarily be broader, as we move away from realizing only the
negative aspects of Spanish law on religion.
For example, the Catholic Church sometimes complains about
not receiving enough economic aid from the state, including funds
for the preservation of its historic patrimony, which constitutes an
essential part of Spanish cultural heritage. It also complains about
continuous reforms on the financing schemes for private Catholic
schools, as well as the juridical rules governing religious education in
public schools (not excepting the controversial issue of religion
teachers’ legal status, allegedly to the detriment of the provisions of
the 1979 Agreement on Education and Cultural Affairs).65 It also
worries about the removal of Christian symbols from public places or
ceremonies. Finally, the Catholic Church is concerned about laws
that are said to undermine moral values of Christian origin, especially
in the areas of family and bioethics, which the Church deems vital for
the correct functioning of a secular society.66
It is not my intention to judge here the merits of those
reproaches, but the facts perhaps reveal a social panorama more

65. Acuerdo sobre Enseñanza y Asuntos Culturales, Jan. 3, 1979 (Instrumento de
ratificación of Dec. 4, 1979, B.O.E. Dec. 15, 1979). Religious teaching in public schools is
regulated in Articles I-VIII of the Agreement.
66. See The Bishops’ Conference, http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es (last visited July
22, 2006) (detecting the main concerns of Spanish Catholic hierarchy).
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optimistic for the Catholic Church. In an era of de-Christianization
in the entire Western world and in Europe in particular, 81% of
Spanish citizens declare themselves Catholic.67 The vast majority of
parents demand Catholic religious education in private and public
schools.68 A significant percentage of marriages are celebrated
according to the form and rules of canon law,69 and a high
percentage of children born in Spain are baptized in the Catholic
Church.70 We are also witnessing an extraordinary flourishing of
non-profit organizations of explicit or implicit Catholic inspiration
that carry out numerous and significant works of social assistance,
inside and outside Spain. In other words, it appears that the change
in the Spanish State’s approach from confessionality to neutrality has
not had such negative consequences for the Catholic Church in
Spain. It is true that the Church’s institutional presence in public life
has decreased, but its social influence continues to be enormous.
On the other hand, the religious federations that are the
beneficiaries of 1992 Agreements—Protestants, Jews, and Muslims—
complain about what they deem is unjustified and discriminatory
legal treatment in comparison with the Catholic Church. They refer,
above all, to some aspects of State economic cooperation, to
religious education in public schools, to religious assistance in
military establishments, hospitals or penitentiaries, and to the lesser
civil effects of their religious marriage (in particular, the irrelevance
67. See Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Research),
http://www.embusa.es/religiousfreedomsp2004.html (last visited July 22, 2006) (affirming
the data).
68. During the 2004–2005 academic year, 72.2% of the students in public schools
opted for Catholic religious education. The percentage is still higher in private non-religious
schools: 81.7%. And, naturally, the percentage is much higher in Catholic schools: 99.5%.
From the total number of students in pre-university education, approximately two-thirds
attend public schools and one-third attend private schools (the immense majority of which are
Catholic). See Episcopal Commission for Teaching and Catechesis within the Spanish Bishops’
Conference, http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es/actividades/2005/febrero_14.htm (last
visited July 22, 2006).
69. The approximate proportion is four to three in favor of civil marriages compared to
canonical marriages, according to the data of 2000, obtained from the Instituto Nacional de
Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), http://www.ine.es/inebase/index.html (last
visited July 22, 2006). On January 14, 2003, the Catholic news agency Zenit provided similar
data based on information from the Bishops’ Conference. See Zenit, www.zenit.org (last visited
July 22, 2006).
70. In 2000 there were 283,226 christenings out of 397,632 births. See Instituto
Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), http://www.ine.es/inebase/
index.html (last visited July 22, 2006).
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of the decisions of Jewish and Islamic courts on the nullity and
dissolution of marriages).71
Again, this is not the right context to deliver a detailed judgment
on the merits of those complaints, but, undoubtedly, Spain’s legal
order still needs a certain fine-tuning with respect to the application
of the equality principle. At the same time, however, it is also true
that those major religious minorities never enjoyed, in all of Spain’s
history, the level of freedom and State cooperation that they enjoy
now. This includes, of course, the matters regulated by the 1992
Agreements. Moreover, we should remember that they have specific
institutional channels of dialogue and negotiation with the State;
namely, the creation of mixed commissions for the development and
control of the 1992 agreements72 and the right to appoint, as
representatives of their respective federations, members of the
Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom in the Ministry of
Justice, which must give an opinion on every government initiative
relating to the application of the LOLR.73 We should not lose sight
of the fact that the current Spanish system, notwithstanding all its
possible limitations or deficiencies, has placed the Protestant, Jewish,
and Islamic religions in the best legal position they have ever had in
Spanish history.74
Other minority religious denominations registered with the
Registry of Religious Entities, and therefore having juridical
personality in Spanish law, argue that they do not benefit from the
principle of State cooperation, for it is, in practice, reserved to the
churches or religious communities that have reached a formal
agreement according to LOLR article 7. In other words, they affirm
71. See generally DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA, supra note 61. See also LÓPEZ ALARCÓN &
NAVARRO-VALLS, supra note 57. For the rest, any good textbook of “ecclesiastical law of the
state” (derecho eclesiástico del Estado) should provide an overview of the legal status of religious
denominations in Spain. See, e.g., DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO (Rafael Navarro-Valls
& Javier Martínez-Torrón eds.), available at www.iustel.com; DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL
ESTADO ESPAÑOL (Javier Ferrer Ortiz ed., 2004).
72. See Third Additional Disposition of the Agreements with the Protestant, Jewish and
Islamic federations.
73. See LOLR, supra note 6, art. 8(2).
74. It is significant, perhaps, that Spain has hardly experienced any of the problems
concerning the use of religious garments or symbols in schools that have recently emerged in
other European countries, especially with regard to Islam. See paragraphs 55 through 65 of
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, an important decision made in the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights on November 10, 2005, for a glimpse into the attitude of diverse
European legal systems on the use of the Islamic headscarf in schools.
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that their registration as religious denominations does not grant
them any specific guarantee or support in comparison with ordinary
associations under civil law. In their view, this is discriminatory,
especially taking into account the fact that some of them have more
members than many of the single churches included in the 1992
Agreements.75
I must admit that this is a powerful argument76 that moves us to
face what probably is the most visible deficiency of Spain’s system of
relations between state and religion: the application of the equality
principle to religious denominations. The same argument also
suggests the necessity of revising the current configuration of the
Registry of Religious Entities. This, because of its scarce relevance,
seems to be in a sort of sterile “no man’s land,” halfway between a
system lacking controls and respecting the spontaneity of religious
social life (Anglo-American style) and a system of true control
conceived as an efficient instrument to select the groups deserving to
benefit from State cooperation. In any event, we should bear in
mind, once again, that minority religions, whatever their social
rooting, have reached a freedom of activity that was unimaginable
not many years ago. And they also have—as far as they are
recognized as having well-known roots in Spanish society—the
possibility of negotiating, under LOLR article 7, a formal
cooperation agreement with the State, thus reaching a higher legal
status.77
Finally, there are still some groups that declare themselves
religious and claim that the State has failed to recognize their
religious nature and has consequently denied them access to the
Registry of Religious Entities. Some cases have attracted the
attention of public opinion, especially the ones regarding the

75. We should bear in mind that the three Agreements of 1992 were concluded with
three federations of religious communities and not with single churches. For example, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah’s Witnesses each have more members
than the entirety of all Jewish communities in Spain.
76. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 21, at 139–45, 184–95; DIEZ AÑOS DE
VIGENCIA, supra note 61, at 111–19, 132–38.
77. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Until now, apart form the three
federations that signed 1992 Agreements, only the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
has been recognized as having well-known roots. However, there are no visible signs revealing
that the government is prepared to negotiate a cooperation agreement with the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
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Unification Church and the Church of Scientology, both of which
have more or less spread in other countries.
With respect to these claims, groups that have been refused
registration as religious entities certainly can obtain legal personality
in civil law with virtually the same effects through registration as
ordinary associations. However, in a country that has a preference for
registries and in which religion continues to have a remarkable
influence, it is important for some groups to be recognized as a
religion by the State. Such recognition provides them a certain “aura
of respectability” that constitutes a distinctive element from common
associations. In any event, we should not forget a significant decision
of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the issue of registration
regarding a claim (recurso de amparo) filed by the Unification
Church.78 Despite criticism of that decision because of evident flaws
and ambiguity in its rationale, the Court openly held that the
Registry of Religious Entities is obliged to follow more flexible
criteria of admission and that State officials are not permitted either
to exercise a rigorous control on the religious nature of applicant
groups or to use for that purpose a concept of religion rooted in
Western history.79 However, the actual influence of this
Constitutional Court decision on administrative praxis is
questionable; significantly, the Church of Scientology, whose
registration raised controversial issues similar to those of the
Unification Church, was again recently denied the right to register as
a religious denomination.80
VI. SOME REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The preceding observations reveal that the Spanish system of
church-state relations, though reasonable overall, is certainly
78. Spanish Constitutional Court, STC, Feb. 15, 2001 (S.T.C., No. 46).
79. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish
Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 742–46.
80. According to the data on file in the Ministry of Justice, the refusal of Scientology’s
application for registration was decided by the Permanent Commission of the Advisory
Commission on Religious Freedom on February 3, 2005 (the issue was not submitted to the
Plenary Commission for decision; this was the third time Scientology applied to be registered;
the two first applications date back to March 28, 1983, and December 6, 1983). Spanish
courts, however, seem to have been more receptive to the Constitutional Court’s doctrine, as
demonstrated by the decision Audiencia Nacional (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo) of
April 21, 2005, in favor of the Self-Realization Fellowship Church, which had been denied
registration for allegedly lacking religious aims.
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perfectible. Indeed, the current socialist government has inherited
from the previous conservative government an interest in revising,
and probably in reforming, diverse aspects of Spanish law on
religion, including the Organic Law on Religious Freedom itself, as
well as the regulation of the Registry of Religious Entities, which has
shown more and more deficiencies over the last decade. Although
the perspectives of the two governments differ in many aspects, they
seem to coincide on a significant point: the timing of legislative
revision. Neither government has shown great impatience to
conclude it. This fact may express a certain degree of satisfaction
with the status quo, so high and widely spread that only some
scholars and some religious minorities, representing a small
percentage of the population, actually insist upon those legislative
modifications. Or perhaps it is just an expression of conformism in
view of the difficulties to effect legislative amendments in this area.
Part of the problem derives from the difficulty of isolating
individual issues that can be reformed without reconsidering the
entire conception of the system. Probably, as indicated before, the
most important concrete questions relate to the application of the
equality principle. But to solve these questions adequately would
lead to an assessment of how consistent the principle of equality is
with a system of church-state relations based upon the notion that
the State recognizes diverse levels of religious denominations
depending on their social roots, with the consequence that a
different legal status—especially with regard to state cooperation—
corresponds to each level. In other words, we would need to
evaluate whether the Spanish multi-tier system of church-state
relations is totally compatible with our constitutional concept of
equal justice, taking into account that almost all manifestations of
State cooperation (and undoubtedly the main ones) are reserved to
those confessions that have been deemed to “deserve” a formal
cooperation agreement with the state after being recognized as
having “well-known roots” in Spanish society.
This, indeed, poses some conceptual questions from the
perspective of equality and State neutrality. On the one hand, it does
not seem justifiable that the number of adherents of a religion
conditions forms of state cooperation when this cooperation is
supposed to be founded, in principle, on the religious nature of a
group and not on its size. Tax exemptions and the civil effects of
religious marriage ceremonies—both reserved to the religious
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denominations that have reached an agreement with the state—are
two examples of this anomaly. On the other hand, although
differences between tiers of religious denominations only affect, in
theory, state cooperation, in practice they often result in diverse
degrees of actual freedom and “social respectability.” This can be of
significance in a State constitutionally obliged to actively promote
public freedoms81 and in a society accustomed to believing that a
higher degree of state recognition entails stronger proof of moral
acceptability. We could still add that access to the maximum level of
cooperation—formal cooperative agreements with the state—is
governed by rules written in ambiguous terms, which grant an
excessive margin of discretion to public authorities (in particular to
the executive power).
In spite of the foregoing, we must not lose historical perspective
when analyzing the Spanish church-state system. An historic
understanding is necessary to avoid unjust judgments on the past
and to facilitate an accurate assessment of the key elements that may
serve as orientation for future legislative reforms. In this respect, it is
worth reiterating that in the last twenty-five years, religion has ceased
to be, for the first time in our history, a cause of serious social and
political conflict. In retrospect, there have been, no doubt, tensions
between public authorities and religious denominations, especially
the Catholic Church and, more recently, Islamic communities. It is
inevitable that political tension emerges occasionally in the context
of church-state relations, such as the one prevailing in the Occident,
which has been expressively described as a “frontier system”82 and is
characterized by an acceptance of the reciprocal autonomy of civil
and religious society. However, the last quarter of a century has
witnessed a situation of stable “religious peace” in Spain, together
with a protection of freedom of religion or belief we had not known
before, because Spain adopted its constitutional principles on
religion by a large social and political consensus.83 This fact deserves
81. See C.E., supra note 6, art. 9(2); see also supra text accompanying note 55.
82. See RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS & RAFAEL PALOMINO, ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN: TEXTOS
PARA UNA REFLEXIÓN CRÍTICA 10 (2d ed. 2003).
83. This distinguishes Spain from other countries, such as France and the United States,
whose fundamental principles on church-state relations have become a myth with the passage
of time, despite the fact that they generated a strong division in society at the time of their
adoption and for a long time afterwards. See generally CHÉLINI-PONT & GUNN, supra note 14
(commenting on an historical revision of the principles of laïcité in France and of religious
freedom in the U.S.).
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a positive evaluation, for it has proven essential for the consolidation
of democracy in Spain. The benefits are evident: for the state, for the
citizens of any faith (or of no faith), and for religious denominations,
not excluding the Catholic Church, which has lost certain historical
privileges but possesses more authentic autonomy now than in the
times of traditional confessional monarchy or under Franco’s regime.
I would like to conclude by emphasizing that Spain has not
reached this situation through a system of strict separation between
Church and State or through the privileged support to the major
religion that is typical of a confessional State. Rather, Spain has
accomplished this through a system in which State neutrality has
been understood as compatible with an active cooperation with
religious denominations. This compatibility has been perhaps the
most crucial factor in the success of the Spanish system of relations
between state and religion. The success of the system is manifested
not only in the creation of a correct formal framework for the
protection of religious freedom, but also in the transformation—in
just a few years—of the way that Spaniards approach religious
diversity, intellectually as well as emotionally. It is important to bear
this in mind with a view to the future. If Spain follows the right
policy, its society, which is gradually becoming more pluri-religious
and pluri-cultural, is not necessarily destined to become more
conflictive.
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